

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION**

Danny Oliver,	:	
	:	
	:	Civil Action No.: 4:09-cv-4044
Plaintiff,	:	
v.	:	
Federal Bond & Collection Service, Inc.; and	:	
DOES 1-10, inclusive,	:	COMPLAINT
	:	
Defendants.	:	

For this Complaint, the Plaintiff, Danny Oliver, by undersigned counsel, states as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This action arises out of the Defendants' repeated violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"), and the invasions of the Plaintiff's personal privacy by the Defendants and their agents in their illegal efforts to collect a consumer debt.
2. Supplemental jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337.
3. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(b), in that the Defendants transact business in this District and a substantial portion of the acts giving rise to this action occurred in this District.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff, Danny Oliver ("Plaintiff"), is an adult individual residing in Houston, Texas, and is a "consumer" as the term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).

5. Defendant Federal Bond & Collection Service, Inc. (“FBCS”), is a Pennsylvania business entity with an address of 2200 Byberry Road, Suite 120, Hatboro, Pennsylvania 19040, operating as a collection agency, and is a “debt collector” as the term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

6. Does 1-10 (the “Collectors”) are individual collectors employed by FBCS and whose identities are currently unknown to the Plaintiff. One or more of the Collectors may be joined as parties once their identities are disclosed through discovery.

7. FBCS Bond & Collection Service, Inc. at all times acted by and through one or more of the Collectors.

ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS

A. The Debt

8. A financial obligation (the “Debt”) was incurred in connection with a payday loan.

9. The Debt arose from services provided by a creditor which were primarily for family, personal or household purposes and which meets the definition of a “debt” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

10. The Debt was purchased, assigned or transferred to FBCS for collection, or FBCS was employed by the Creditor to collect the Debt.

11. The Defendants attempted to collect the Debt and, as such, engaged in “communications” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).

B. FBCS Engages in Harassment and Abusive Tactics

12. The Defendants telephoned the Plaintiff every couple of days, sometimes twice a day, including on weekends.

13. The Defendants were very rude to the Plaintiff and used profanity during telephone conversations. One of the debt collectors told Plaintiff, "You're the reason that the economy is the way it is."

14. The Defendants stated that the Debt was in connection with a payday loan that the Plaintiff borrowed in 2002 in Illinois. The Defendants also told the Plaintiff that they had his social security number.

15. The Plaintiff repeatedly told the Defendants that he never borrowed a payday loan and did not incur the Debt.

16. The Plaintiff asked the Defendants to stop calling him. The Defendants refused to stop calling.

17. The Plaintiff sent the Defendants a letter disputing the Debt.

18. After receiving the Plaintiff's letter, the Defendants telephoned the Plaintiff and cursed at him and told him that he owed the debt and they would not stop calling.

19. The Defendants failed to mail the Plaintiff a validation notice informing him of the original debt and identifying the original creditor.

20. The Defendants failed to mail the Plaintiff a notice informing him of his right to dispute the Debt and to obtain verification of the Debt.

C. Plaintiff Suffered Actual Damages

21. The Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer actual damages as a result of the Defendants' unlawful conduct.

22. As a direct consequence of the Defendants' acts, practices and conduct, the Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer from humiliation, anger, anxiety, emotional distress, fear, frustration and embarrassment.

23. The Defendants' conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

COUNT I

VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.

24. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.

25. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d in that the Defendants engaged in conduct in connection with the collection of a debt the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person.

26. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2) in that the Defendants used profane and abusive language when speaking with the consumer.

27. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) in that the Defendants caused a phone to ring repeatedly and engaged the Plaintiff in telephone conversations, with the intent to annoy and harass.

28. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) in that the Defendants employed false and deceptive means to collect a debt.

29. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) in that the Defendants attempted to collect an amount not authorized by the agreement creating the debt.

30. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) in that the Defendants failed to send the Plaintiff a validation notice stating the amount of the debt.

31. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) in that the Defendants failed to send the Plaintiff a validation notice stating the name of the original creditor to whom the debt was owed.

32. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) in that the Defendants failed to send the Plaintiff a validation notice stating the Plaintiff's right to dispute the debt within thirty days.

33. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) in that the Defendants failed to send the Plaintiff a validation notice informing the Plaintiff of a right to have verification and judgment mailed to the Plaintiff.

34. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) in that the Defendants failed to send the Plaintiff a validation notice containing the name and address of the original creditor.

35. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) in that the Defendants continued collection efforts even though the debt had not been validated.

36. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the FDCPA, including every one of the above-cited provisions.

37. The Plaintiff is entitled to damages as a result of the Defendants' violations.

COUNT II

VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION ACT

TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392, et al.

38. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.

39. The Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001(1).

40. The Defendants are each a “debt collector” and a “third party debt collector” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001(6) and (7).

41. The Defendants used abusive and profane language when speaking with the Plaintiff, in violation of Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.302(1).

42. The Defendants caused a telephone to ring repeatedly, with the intent to annoy or abuse the Plaintiff, in violation of Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.302(4).

43. The Defendants attempted to collect a charge, fee or expense unauthorized by agreement, in violation of Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.303(a)(2).

44. The Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief and actual damages pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(1) and (2) and to remedies under Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 17.62 pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.404(a).

COUNT III

INVASION OF PRIVACY BY INTRUSION INTO PRIVATE AFFAIRS

45. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.

46. The Restatement of Torts, Second, § 652(b) defines intrusion upon seclusion as, “One who intentionally intrudes...upon the solitude or seclusion of another, or his private affairs

or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”

47. Texas further recognizes the Plaintiff’s right to be free from invasions of privacy, thus the Defendants violated Texas state law.

48. To establish a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion into private affairs, the plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant intentionally intruded of the plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs; (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of the defendant’s intrusion. *Valenzuela v. Aquino*, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993).

49. The Defendants intentionally intruded upon the Plaintiff’s right to privacy by continually harassing the Plaintiff with repeated telephone calls.

50. The telephone calls made by the Defendants to the Plaintiff were so persistent and repeated with such frequency as to be considered, “hounding the plaintiff,” and, “a substantial burden to her existence,” thus satisfying the Restatement of Torts, Second, § 652(b) and Texas law requirements for an invasion of privacy.

51. The conduct of the Defendants in engaging in the illegal collection activities resulted in multiple invasions of privacy in such a way as would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person.

52. As a result of the intrusions and invasions, the Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial from the Defendants.

53. All acts of the Defendants and their agents were committed with malice, intent, wantonness, and recklessness, and as such, the Defendants are subject to punitive damages.

COUNT IV

INTENTIONAL INFILCTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

54. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length.

55. To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's conduct was directed at the plaintiff or at a third person in the plaintiff's presence; (4) the defendant's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (5) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe.

Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1998).

56. The acts, practices and conduct engaged in by the Defendants vis-à-vis the Plaintiff was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

57. The foregoing conduct constitutes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress under the laws of the State of Texas.

58. All acts of the Defendants and the Collectors complained of herein were committed with malice, intent, wantonness, and recklessness, and as such, the Defendants are subject to imposition of punitive damages.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered against the Defendants:

1. Actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1) against the Defendants;
2. Statutory damages of \$1,000.00 for each violation pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) against the Defendants;
3. Costs of litigation and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) against the Defendants;
4. Injunctive relief pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(1);
5. Actual damages pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(2);
6. Remedies under Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 17.62 pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.404(a);
7. Actual damages from the Defendants for the all damages including emotional distress suffered as a result of the intentional, reckless, and/or negligent FDCPA violations and intentional, reckless, and/or negligent invasions of privacy in an amount to be determined at trial for the Plaintiff;
8. Punitive damages; and
9. Such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED ON ALL COUNTS

Dated: December 18, 2009

Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Diana P. Larson
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